Tear gas fired for the first time at demonstrators. The regime had organised its own pro-Assad demonstrations and used tear gas to disperse the Kurdish anti-Assad demos. People were brought in from Hasakeh to participate in pro-Assad demos.
Tear gas fired at demonstrators in Amûde today, 30 June, as they call for the fall of the regime.
Another video here.
A 32-year-old Kurdish activist from Syria, called ‘Jan’ in an interview with KurdWatch, says that there are many different Kurdish groups working together to organise the demonstrations in the Kurdish areas of the country. They primarily work online and in secret, and work together with other Syrian opposition groups in a vast online network.
While Kurds are very active now, Fawzi Shingar, founder of the Kurdish Wifaq Party in Syria, said in a recent interview with Rudaw that the Syrian Kurds were surprisingly quiet when demonstrations started, ‘keeping a wary eye on the protests but not joining them.’ But he calls the organisation of the demonstrations ‘haphazard and without proper leadership.’ Wifaq, a minor political party, was founded in 2005 by splitting from the PYD (Partîya Yekîtî ya Demokratîk or Democratic Union Party), which is closely linked to the PKK. Wifaq is the Arabic name and it is sometimes referred to as ‘Kurdish Accord’ in English. Its Kurdish name is Rêkeftina Demokrat a Kurd ya Sûrî.
Protests in Syria have been going on for more than three months. Kurds began protesting on 01 April, about two weeks after demonstrations started in Dera’a.
When asked who is involved in the demonstrations, Jan responded that it is ‘mostly young people,’ but that demonstrations attract people from all walks of life. He also said that some join the protests because they are ‘unhappy with their own personal situation and are hoping for improvement.’ And they all take part despite the fact that they know they could be arrested. He also adds that there are many who are ‘sympathetic to our demonstrations, but don’t take part.’ One reason for their reluctance, he says, is ‘the absence of Arabs and Christians’ at the protests in Qamişlo.
Fawzi Shingar of Wifaq
Shingar seems to agree with Jan’s observation that participants are ‘mostly young people’ saying that the ‘biggest influence on the demonstrations is the Kurdish youth.’ Wifaq and other parties have participated in the protests, but ‘those who started and continue them today are the youth,’ said Shingar.
Jan, the activist, said a general representative from the Kurdish groups is in constant contact with the representatives of other Syrian groups. They make suggestions for the slogan for the weekly Friday demonstrations online and then the representatives of the various groups agree on one. On 19 May the slogan was Azadî (Freedom in Kurdish). This was done, said Jan, ‘to show that the Kurds and the Kurdish language are a part of Syria.’
By the middle of the week the slogan is agreed upon and banners are distributed in each city. In Qamişlo activists gather at the Qasimo Mosque every Friday and wait until people are finished with the Friday prayer and then join the activists. Most demonstrators come to the mosque not to pray, but just to take part in the demonstration. In the days before the demonstration, Jan says, flyers, word of mouth, and Facebook are main tools used to notify everyone of the demonstration, which lasts half an hour. It usually ends with various speeches by parties and other organisations. Afterwards, the banners are immediately destroyed.
Shingar said that the government’s policy so far has been to make the Kurdish areas neutral so they won’t have to attack them. Some military outposts that the Syrian regime stationed in the Kurdish areas after the 2004 uprising were withdrawn at the outset of the protests. According to Shingar, the area is now mainly controlled by the police and intelligence services.
Says Jan, intelligence services are ever present and observe the demonstrations and film them, but have orders not to attack the demonstrators. After the demonstrations, some activists are routinely arrested and later released from custody. They are often charged with participating in an unauthorised demonstration.
Jan says that the activists are in regular contact with the Kurdish parties. The Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî), The Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî) and the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria in particular support the demonstrations and take part in them and many activists have a partisan political background.
Shingar said that some Kurdish parties, mentioning the same three that Jan makes note of, joined the protests, adopting the motto of regime removal, after Syrian security forces had intervened and made the situation worse. Referring back to the importance of the youth in the demonstrations, Shingar said however that ‘the political parties cannot be compared to the power of the people.’
Each of us has a task related to getting information out, says Jan. Some record videos and others take photos with their cell phones. Material are immediately whisked off to a secret location and sent to the media or published online. Being so close to the Turkish border, many activists have Turkish Internet connections, which allow for faster and easier transfer of information.
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The interview with Fawzi Shingar is at Rudaw here.
The interview with ‘Jan’ is at KurdWatch here.
Istanbul MP Sebahat Tuncel after being pepper-sprayed by police. Photo from Nûkurd.
Thousands of Kurds were out in the Şişli area of Istanbul earlier today protesting the Turkish Supreme Election Board’s decision to strip independent candidate Hatip Dicle of his win in the 12 June elections. Police violently dispersed the crowds using tear gas and pepper spray.
The group, including the Deputies Sebahat Tuncel, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Levent Tüzel, gathered around Şişli Mosque and planned to march in Taksim Square but were blocked by anti-riot forces.
Istanbul MPs Sebahat Tuncel and Sırrı Süreyya Önder were taken to hospital suffering from respiratory difficulties. Some protestors took shelter in local stores.
Ten people were wounded and 23 were taken into custody.
Afterwards, police followed some demonstrators into the majority Kurdish Tarlabasi neighbourhood. Squads were posted at the top of streets leading into neighbourhood, along Tarlabasi Boulevard.
Below are some videos from the protests:
More photos can be seen at Nûkurd website here.
Hatip Dicle, independent Kurdish candidate for Turkish Parliament, has been stripped of his parliamentary victory by the Supreme Election Board (YSK) of Turkey. With it, Turkey has stripped away the last veneer of its façade of presumptive innocence. Any claim now that Turkey, whether from its judiciary or any other branch of government, is in any way shape or form working towards a rapprochement with the Kurds, can be, and must be, labelled a figment of nationalist imagination or collective delusion.
Mr Dicle won a seat on 12 June with 78,220 votes, or 11.2% of the total votes in the Diyarbakır province. He lost that seat on 21 June with 7 votes, or 100% of the total votes of the YSK judges. Their decision is symptomatic of deep-rooted antipathy towards Kurdish aspirations of parity in Turkish society.
Mr Dicle sits in prison charged with terrorism, as outlined by the country’s rigidly militaristic constitution and legal codes, which are only fraught with antediluvian notions of racism and intolerance. The judges claim that they are bound by the law of the land and have no choice. The AKP shrugs and says it is out of their hands. This nonchalant attitude is unacceptable and morally unconscionable.
The new Parliament, from which Dicle has been excluded, will be tasked with drafting a new, inclusive constitution, which everyone agrees is long overdue. However, a civilian constitution, regardless of its form or offerings, would only be a structural change. A new constitutional landscape is not going to change the deeply embedded attitudes or the psychocultural dynamics driving those attitudes. More simply, as Gandhi said, ‘The spirit of democracy is not a mechanical thing to be adjusted by abolition of forms. It requires change of heart.’
Any structural change needs to be accompanied by something deeper, more profound. A start would be an acknowledgement by the Turkish government of the decades of oppression and repressive policies against the Kurds, followed by a formally negotiated, public apology. It is from this point where ‘change of heart’ may begin to flourish, with the constitution as a guide, to begin national healing.
The Kurdish Democratic Society Congress has announced that without Dicle, no one from the newly-elected Block will enter Parliament. At the same time thousands are in the streets venting anger over the YSK decision and years of political harassment. What happens in the coming days will be crucial if any progress is to be made.
Martin Luther King, Jr, the great American civil rights leader, gave a speech in the summer of 1963 in which he said, ‘We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.’
The decision not to enter Parliament can be seen as dignity and discipline. The street protests must remain peaceful, for no healing can come from violence. Soul force, only. Kurdish soul force. And this too will be seen as coming from ‘the high plane.’
King continues in his speech, ‘In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred.’
Let the cup of bitterness and hatred be drained. Let Hatip Dicle stand now, proudly, as the new symbol of Kurdish soul force. Let the name ‘Hatip Dicle’ ring out as a call for all Kurds to come together peacefully to overcome the ingrained institution of bigotry. Drink now from the cup of Kurdish soul force.
Yes, this is totally random and has nothing to do with anything really. I was going through an old box of stuff and came across some photographs and felt the need to share this particular one (which has been hidden away for many years now). I shot it in Deir ez-Zour in the mid-90s while there visiting a friend. It’s the wall outside of a kindergarten with Jerry the mouse and Hafez al-Assad, the late Syrian president. Seeing this was a nice change from all the Hafez, Basil and Bashar imagery around everywhere at that time. And it’s a cute image for little school children in their blue smocks as they enter the school, right?
Well, I just went to Wikipedia to look up Tom and Jerry, the cartoon in which Jerry appeared. It says:
The short episodes are infamous for some of the most comically gory gags ever devised in theatrical animation, such as Jerry slicing Tom in half, shutting his head in a window or a door, Tom using everything from axes, firearms, explosives, traps and poison to try to murder Jerry, Jerry stuffing Tom’s tail in a waffle iron and a mangle, kicking him into a refrigerator, plugging his tail into an electric socket, pounding him with a mace, club or mallet, causing a tree or an electric pole to drive him into the ground, sticking matches into his feet and lighting them, tying him to a firework and setting it off, and so on.
Hmmm. It never dawned on me that there was so much in common between this cartoon character and the Assad clan.
Labour, Freedom and Democracy Block
It has been a week since the 12 June elections in Turkey. The dust is settling and a clearer picture is emerging of what’s in store for the new parliament once the next legislative session begins around 01 October. High on the agenda is the drafting of a new, civilian constitution. The current constitution, put into effect in 1982 on the heels of the 1980 military coup, is based on a Kemalist notion of Turkish national identity, which is homogeneous and leaves no room for ethnic and religious difference. It is a ‘straightjacket’ on Turkish democracy, limiting the rights of individuals and privileging the state at the expense of the citizen.
The swearing in ceremony for MPs in the 550-seat Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Turkish Parliament, or simply Meclis in Turkish) will be 24 June. The day before the swearing-in, a newly formed commission from the pro-Kurdish Labour, Democracy and Freedom Block (in Kurdish, Bloka Ked, Azadî û Demokrasî, or KAD), which won 36 seats, will issue a declaration. The statement will clarify the KAD-Block’s standing in the parliament, the way, methods and strategies to be followed for a solution to problems. The KAD-Block was created and supported by the BDP, the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party.
On Sunday evening last, as results were still coming in, Turkish PM Erdoğan said that the nation had not only given his party a mandate to govern, but to draft a new constitution: ‘The people gave us a message to build the new constitution through consensus and negotiation.’ He said that the AKP would discuss the new constitution with opposition parties and parties outside of parliament, in ‘all-encompassing’ negotiations.
With their 36 seats, the KAD-Block will play an important role in any future constitutional debate, and the Kurdish question looks set to move to the top of the political agenda. Said Sebahat Tuncel, Kurdish MP from Istanbul in a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times, Erdoğan ‘now faces a major domestic challenge,’ referring to the writing up a new, inclusive constitution. She also said that the 36-MP strong block ‘will be the most effective check on the AKP’s destructive policy’ of repressing the Kurds.
However, some are expressing caution regarding the KAD-Block’s calls for specific demands. Taha Akyol, for example, a political analyst with CNNTürk and Milliyet newspaper, said that while the BDP has become ‘a force that cannot be ignored’ it ‘must know the limits of its demands.’ While Akyol is a Turkish nationalist, this will certainly be an issue in the constitutional negotiations, as the AKP is not going to want to be seen as caving in to Kurdish demands. After all, Erdoğan ran a very nationalist campaign to garner MHP (far-right, nationalist party) votes. But, after the election, Erdoğan apologised to his rivals for his actions and language during the campaigns. Erdoğan’s words were probably meant more to take votes from the MHP party to keep them from reaching the 10% election threshold. But still, it will be hard now to backpedal.
Ahmet Türk, newly elected KAD MP from Mêrdîn said that the ‘new constitution must be based on democratic autonomy, which must be a topic in the open for discussion and we will work towards this. If these demands are ignored by the state, the people will create their own method to establish the system they are aiming for.’
Leyla Zana speaks in Diyarbakır
Leyla Zana, elected from Diyarbakır, speaking in Kurdish to an audience of tens of thousands at a rally last Monday said, ‘The Kurds will be a partner of this state.’ While the logical assumption is that MPs elected from the pro-Kurdish KAD Block will be partners (the AKP needs partners), it is not clear to what extent Kurds will be included in the process of re-writing the country’s constitution.
Murat Yetkin, writing for Hürriyet Daily News, says the ‘CHP (centre-left, People’s Republican Party) is always a safer partner for the AKP for major political projects like amending or rewriting the constitution, in order to secure a consensus acceptable for a wider base in society. The BDP, which is focused more on Kurdish rights, might be an easier partner for Erdoğan at first sight, but such a partnership, which might exclude both the CHP and the MHP, might cause new fault lines in Turkey’s political arena. It may cast a shadow, says Yetkin, over the new constitution, creating doubts whether the government sort of bargained for the presidential system in return for group – not individual – rights for Kurds.’
Some of the conditions the Kurds will expect in any new constitution, says KAD MP-elect Hasip Kaplan from southeastern province of Şırnak, are the implementation of democratic autonomy, the use of mother tongues and the granting of constitutional citizenship.’ He also said that it should contain ‘expansion of freedom of thought in its largest sense.’
These are ‘demands’ that may be outside of the ‘limits’ referred to by Akyol. But what then is left? How can the Kurds accept anything less than full equality as Kurdish citizens of the Turkish Republic? In a meeting of Turkish intellectuals, journalists and lawyers earlier last week, Osman Can, one of the lawyers present, called on political parties to abandon what they earlier termed ‘red lines’ and said parties must decide to talk without preconditions. One of the ‘reddest’ of lines is that of mother-tongue education in Kurdish. It is a flashpoint in the debate on Kurdish rights and a key theme of the Kurd’s political agenda. Abandoning red lines may be easier said than done.
Nabi Avcı, a newly elected AKP deputy from Eskişehir and former senior media advisor to Erdoğan, said at a meeting with members of the foreign press that the ‘Kurdish issue’ is also on the government’s agenda ‘not as a problem but as a broader issue.’ He also said that ‘it is not right to highlight any priorities at the moment.’
Some of these comments may not bode well for Kurdish expectations. Ahmet Türk says that ‘the election results mean that the Kurdish people are united and our demands are going to be on the national agenda. If not, there will be more pain and more problems in the future’ and that if their ‘demands are ignored by the state, the people will create their own method to establish the system they are aiming for.’
The threat of ‘more pain and more problems in the future’ that Türk mentioned is real, according to the deputy head of the ruling AKP in Diyarbakır, Mohammed Akar. He says that if there is disappointment, the whole idea of integration will end. Separation and conflict will come to the fore. Akar added that ‘the danger that is lying ahead is a nightmare.’
The AKP may have received the largest percentage of popular votes at 49.95%, but the fact is that in 2002 they had 363 seats in the Meclis, in 2007 they had 341 seats, and now, in 2011, the AKP will seat only 326 parliamentarians. From 2007 to 2011, the overall percentage of votes increased by 3.3%, but their percentage of seats in the Meclis will decline by 4.5%.
Erdoğan’s AKP had been vying for a 2/3’s super majority (367 seats), which would have allowed it to rewrite the constitution single-handedly with no input from any other parties. A 3/5’s majority (330 seats) would have offered the AKP the option of drafting a new constitution on its own and then submitting it to a public referendum. They are only four seats from a 3/5’s majority and could try and look for defectors to make up the gap.
click to enlarge
However, the Kurds are the ones who are really gaining ground. In 2007 they captured 20 seats in parliament. This time round the pro-Kurdish KAD-Block managed to get 6.85% of the national vote, which resulted in 36 of its candidates getting elected. Not all of them are Kurdish, which was a strategy the BDP had to broaden its support base. And 11 of the 36 are women. A list of the 36 and election percentages can be found here.
In an attempt to draw support from religious voters, an alliance was formed with two other pro-Kurdish parties—the Participatory Democracy Party (KADEP) and the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR). Former KADEP leader Şerafettin Elçi was picked as a candidate in Diyarbakır.
Political Science at Istanbul University, Dr Nuray Mert, noted that this was ‘a very successful outcome for the Block but it goes unnoticed that the Block didn’t participate in the elections as a political party. Therefore, the elections already began unfair[ly].’
In Diyarbakır, seven KAD-Block candidates got 429,000 votes and won six seats, whereas the AKP received five seats with only 231,000 votes. Without the 10 percent threshold, says Henri Barkey, KAD-Block candidates would have probably gotten as many as 50 seats. In other words, BDP is stronger than the number of seats it will control in the new parliament.
The Kurdish political group may be stronger than the number of seats, but for now they have to work with their strength in parliament. A change in the 10% election threshold will also be a necessary component in any new constitution to ensure more inclusivity in the future.
For now there is a major battle ahead as political camps scramble to put together their bargaining points and prepare for October. It will be interesting to see too what happens between now and the opening of that new, legislative session.
Since the election, the Turkish government has shut down Kurdish media outlets and has continued its arrest waves of Kurdish politicians. More than 100 have been detained in the past week alone. In spite of this, a PKK ceasefire has been extended to see what will happen with reforms and constitutional change. If the repressive methods continue and Erdoğan fails to take an historic step in partnering with the Kurds in the drafting of the new constitution, all hell will break loose.
Speaking of the failure of the AKP to garner its wished-for super-majority and rewrite the constitution by itself, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, said that ‘[g]iven concerns about Erdoğan’s megalomania and authoritarian tendencies that have gained traction in Turkey in recent months, the outcome is good for Turkish democracy.’ Let’s hope it is good too for Kurdish aspirations.
The article below is republished here at the request of the author, Sîrwan Kajjo. The original article was first published at the Fikra Forum on 13 June 2011. The Arabic version of Kajjo’s article can be seen here.
Sîrwan Kajjo
Amidst the daily protests that have characterized the scene in Syria this year, an increasing number of questions are being raised regarding the final outcome in Syria and the impact of the ongoing demonstrations. Those who have closely followed the scene in Syria can clearly see that this movement across the country is the inevitable result of the extreme levels of suppression experienced by Syrians of every class. This is only the beginning of the end of four decades of totalitarian rule.
Syria today is not the Syria we knew before. Who would have predicted that the people would publicly call for the fall of the regime or even dare to demand freedom? Thus, the mechanisms used in activism and struggle are moving in a completely different direction. In fact, before it became a revolution against the country’s regime, it was a revolution within the minds of Syrian citizens.
Over the last forty years, the Syrian regime tried to implant mistrust between the Syrian people and attempted to systematically raise hatred between different sects. However, despite that, the governorates in Syria joined forces in order to support each other. We witnessed the cities of Qamishli, Amouda, and Hasakah in the north, known for their Kurdish majority, advocating on behalf of Deraa and Hama! At the same time, the protesters in Hama and Idlib were calling, “Azadi…Azadi,” which means freedom in Kurdish. If this is indicative of anything, it shows that the people in the street realize the importance of national cohesion in this crucial and sensitive stage in Syria.
The Kurds have long been accused of working for the outside and of calling for the separation from Syria. In fact, many Kurdish political leaders now sit behind bars in Syrian prisons under the false charges of sectioning parts of Syrian land and annexing them to a foreign country, undermining the national sentiment and morale. However, despite all of this, the Kurds have proven to be an integral part of the Syrian fabric. For the first time, the Syrian flag is raised in the Kurdish areas, which indicates their understanding of Syrian political equality. The Kurds are moving away from the nationalistic sentiments which have long been used against them by the system and the Syrian opposition alike.
The Syrian regime tried to take advantage of pre-existing sensitivities between various constituents, but it failed, as mentioned earlier. So, the regime declared war openly on the demonstrators. While the movement began with phrases and slogans calling for freedom and reform, it soon escalated to demands for bringing down the regime. These peaceful protests were met with brutal murder and arbitrary arrests. The Syrian regime has shown no respect for or commitment to international standards and conventions.
On the other hand, the international community did not show a pragmatic attitude towards the Syrian regime. There were comments made here and there, but not at a serious level as hoped for. The expected United Nations Security Council resolution towards Syria will not suffice if it only verbally condemns the daily massacres committed by the regime against innocent men, women, and children. Here we see that it is resting on the U.S. administration to intervene in some way. The United States of America is the only actor who can possibly instigate change on a practical level. Support of the current revolution across Syria is the safest way for the U.S. to help the Syrian people reach the shores of democracy. This support should provide assistance to the younger generation, which has been the main engine behind these demonstrations in Syria. This support can be technical, physical, or even moral.
The American stance is unclear in the sense that Washington seems to believe that the regime still has a chance to change its attitude. Although Obama’s language was tougher in comparison to previous cases, he showed hope that there could be some development in Syria. Maybe the U.S. has not yet absorbed the implications of the rapid changes in Tunisia and Egypt and still ongoing changes in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria.
The Obama Administration must realize that any alternative, democratic system in Syria will be the key solution to many regional problems in the Middle East. A change in the Syrian regime may lead the way for Israel and the Palestinians to take steps towards reaching a mutual solution for peace. In addition, the Syrian people will enjoy complete freedom that has long been a goal of the United States.
Sîrwan Kajjo is a Syrian Kurdish activist and journalist. He is based in Washington, DC as a freelance journalist.
KURDISTAN COMMENTARY 